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The Determination of Individual Hourly Earnings in Urban Kenya - G. Johnson 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the:factors'which 
account for differences among individuals in hourly earnings in the: 
major urban center in Kenya. .There are two principal reasons for 
conducting such an investigation... First, there is an emerging consensus 
among econoirr'ts that the general level of wages in the modern- sector. 
of the "typical" lesser developed country is too. high: to permit the 
efficient allocation of resources. -..Specifically 3 (a) nigh, wages promote 
urban-rural imbalance, thus causing.high rates of:migration to cities 
even in the face of serious urban unemployment and/or unemployment; 
(b) rapid rates of increase . .of. real wages in t, : modern sector has' 
lowered the rate of growth, of employment relative, to outputs. 1 us 
exacerbating the unemployment problem; 1 . and (c) high wages in the modern 
sector reduce domestic resources available for capital accumulation^ both 
public and private, and hence lower the rate of.economic growth -below its 
potential maximum. Knowledge of ..the determinants, of. the structure of 
wages is essential to understanding: why ti. general lev _ is .'too-'high* 1 which 
is in turn necessary for the formulation of a workable incomes policy. 
* - The author, Visiting Research Fellow, Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi ana Associate Professor-oflEconomics , 
The University of Michigan, has benefited from the commen+s and 
suggestions of a • number; of..persons .including 0. Ashenfelter, G. 
Fields", J. Morgan, L, Smith, J. Stiglitz, and VI.E. Whitelaw, and is 
'grateful.to the" Rockefeller Foundation for. financial support. 
1 - See J.R. Harris and M.P. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment,"and"" 
Development: A Two Sector Analysis," American Economic Review.., 
...•:. March-1870 ;4 pp. 126-42.^ • ;; . C" .^..i-, 
2 - See, for example, E.G. Reynolds, ''Wages ana Employment in a Labor-
Surplus Economy," American Economic Review, March 1955, pp. 19-39 
and J =R. Harris and M.P. Todaro, "Wages, Industrial Employment, 
and Labour Productivity," East African Economic Review, June 1969, 
pp. 29-46. 
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Second, questions concerning the distribution of income are interesting 
in any society, and they are especially interesting in societies in which 
per capita income is very low. What are the income advantages of the 
educated, of.union members, of government employees? To what extent are 
females discriminated against in the labor market? Answers to such 
questions are important in their own right as well as providing insights 
into the operation of the aggregate labor market. 
It is quite difficult to attack these questions without reliable 
microeconomic data (i.e., data which provide the joint distribution of 
income, sex, education, union membership status, etc. across individuals), 
but such data are quite rare in lesser developed countries. This paper, 
however, is able to exploit such a data set, that from the Household Survey 
of the Nairobi Urban Study. Although it was primarily concerned with 
specific urban problems such as housing, shopping patterns, and the like, 
this survey contained a. battery of questions on basic socio-economic^ 
3 ^ information. The paper is divided into four sections: In Section I a 
model of individual wage differences is set out; in Section II the model 
is tested on the survey data; in Section. Ill some further tests on special 
hypotheses are reported, and in Section IV various implications of the results 
concerning labor market behavior in lesser developed countries are 
discussed. 
I. The Earnings Function 
In the. absence of institutional impediments to full employment 
the wage.rate paid each worker will depend upon (a) his personal product-
3 - I am especially.indebted to Prof. W.E. Whitelaw, Director of the I.D.S. 
Urban Study, for permission to use these data. 
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ivity and (b) the nonpecuhiary attributes of his particular job. In 
most countries the actual earnings of an individual will be influenced (c) 
by the type of employment •. activity in which he is engaged, unionized, 
government, nonunion private., or self employment, reflecting monopoly 
powers and/or•non-maximizing behavior on the part of some employers. 
Finally, in many societies-there is- (d)~labor market discrimination 
against certain subgroups in the society, and the resultant earnings 
advantages or disadvantages (of being female, a Negro in the United 
States, a Catholic in Northern Ireland, from- a particular tribe in an-
African country , etc. )- must be accounted for in the earnings function. 
We now examine each of these sets of factors in detail. 
(a) Personal Productivity 
: An individual's personal productivity or stock c_ vuman capital 
can be represented by (i) his formal education, (ii) post-for.: training, 
both On and off the job, and (iii) innate ability. Most micri ..conomic data, 
including those used in this study, do not contain (ii), and economists 
are not really sure what (iii) is. To a certain extent, however, the 
increment to the stock of human capital du to experience and other 
forms of post-formal training can be represented by an individual's 
position in the life cycle. ; In 'general, the earnings of a particular in-
dividual relative to other individuals in ,the, work force, holding 
other factors constant, first rise at an increasing rate with age after 
he obtains his first job, then rise at a declining rate, reach a maximum 
somewhere between age 4-5 and. 55, and decline thereafter. This is usually 
attributed to the incidence of post-formal training, high at early and 
4 - For an extensive discussion of the methods, .used to explain earnings 
levels, see Giora Hanoch, Personal Earnings and Investment?in;-:Schooling, 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1955:.-
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low at later ages. 
The effect of education .on the earnings potential of an individual 
can in principle be manipulated to obtain a rate of return to various 
6 
increments of schooling, either a'private or a social. rate.... .. However, 
there are two problems associated with inferring a rate of return 
from cross-sectional data on earnings in the typical lesser developed 
country. First, if. there is substantial unemployment over the range 
of education under.consideration, the probability of obtaining employment 
within various periods of time must be included in the calculation of the 
private rate of .return., and the social rate of return to-educating a 7 
redundant person is negative. Second, with increasing supplies of1" 
educated labor in most lesser developed countries it is very likely that 
the kinds of positions filled by individuals with a .certain level of edu-
cation a generation (or even a.few years) ago are now being.filled by ' -j • • ; 
persons with much more education. This would imply that the observed age-
income profile would overstate the effect of age on potential earnings, 
for to some extent it represents this "seniority effect"', instead of human 
capital accumulation after completion of formal education. " the 
5 - See J. Mincer, "On the Job Training: Costs, Returns, and Some Impli-
cations," Journal, of Political Economy, Supplement, October 1962, 
pp. .50-79 and Yoram Ben Porath, "The Production of Human Capital and 
the Life Cycle of. Earnings,1' Journal of Political Economy, August 1967, 
pp. 352-55. 
6 r-;.:The-<:rate_;o_f: return tb...the .£i:h year of -schooling is that r which 
satisfies 
I {W(E,t)-W(E-l,t)}(.l+r)_t- C - W.(E~1,0) = 0-, 
t=l r ' L ' 
where C£ is the cost,of that..year-of schooling (to the individual for 
the private return, to the society for the social return) and T is the 
number of years the individual has remaining in the labor force. If the 
difference in earnings remains constant with age at .AW., then..the. rate 
of return is roughly equal to (AW/W )/(l+C /W ), where W EW(E-1,0). o E o . o 
7 - Fcr a thorough 
analysis of these issues see G. Fields, "'Private and 
Social Returnsrto. Educati;on.-iS' -tabour Surplus Economiesi" Discussion 
Paper No. 104-, Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi, April 1971. 
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There are, of course, other aspects."of an individual's stock 
,of human capital. , First, it would be very useful to have some measure 
of the•quality of an individual's education. This can be partially 
represented by an index of how good the schooling system the individual 
attended was, say by expenditure per pupil. Related to this is the 
quality of education at home, which would be related to the education 
8 
or occupation of the individual:'s parents. In most developing countries -
certainly most African countries, however", workers' parents rarely had 
any formal ;educatioh at all, so this Variable would probably not show 
- up- as significant, until the next "generation of workers. Second, the 
rapid growth of urban areas i. .• • cou.- ' in most 
underdeveloped countries and the relatively recent emergence of ,< the modern 
sector implies that a large fraction.of,the urban, work, force grew up 
in rural areas and migrated to cities at some i--¥nt. Presumably the 
general skills necessary for successful participation in the dern 
sector will be greater the longer the individual has lived in the: urban 
area, so it should be useful to include a measure of the length of time 
the individual has lived in the urban area, in the explanation of wage 
differences. . . •+•' •.•,:i;!1 ') 
(b) Nonpecuniary Advantages -
In principle one would like to include a set of nonpecuniary 
attributes associated with each individual's job in the~explanaticr of 
wage differences, these would include th$ cleanliness of the.work place, 
_ an .index of the required degt se . of physical exertion', thesocial status of 
the., occupation, and the like. Any variable which increases ttie^oyerall 
8 - Each of these variables, expenditure on schooling and father's education, 
was found to be quite significant in the explanation of earnings for 
a recent national probability sample in the U.S. See G. Johnson 
and F. Stafford, "Social Returns to Quantity and Quality of Schooling," 
University of Michigan working paper, December 1970. 
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attractiveness of the of the job would reduce the wage which the 
employer would have to pay in order to attract a work force of the 
desired quantity and quality, In practice, however, it is rather difficult 
to sort out those variables which should be included in the list, and 
no attempt is made to include any'such variables in this study. A major 
source of difficulty in this respect is the likelihood that individuals 
have different tastes for each particular nonpecuniary attribute - some 
people dp not mind a high degree^ of physical exertion while others do. 
But. this. would imply that individuals'would avoid the types of jobs 
for which, they have-especial aversions, and this in turn suggests that 
nonpecyniary attributes may hot-be terribly important in the determination 
of wages. • ! 
•(c)''Type of Employment Activity 
If the general level of wages in a particular country is too high 
to permit full employment in the modern sector of the typical lesser 
developed country, We-would like to know why. To set up the problem for 
testing we will distinguish between three sets of hypotheses concerning 
the reason for the high wage level: (1) unionism, (2) government as employer, 
g "•••'•• 
and (3) legal and social minimum wages. 
(1) Unionism. If a significant fraction of the work force is 
organized by trade unions, the union movement is to a.significant-extent 
interested in the short run economic welfare of its members, and the 
9 - Very useful summaries of alternative:approaches to wage determination 
in lesser developed countries are contained in E.J. Berg, "Wage Structure 
in Less Developed Countries," inA.D. Smith, ed. , Wage Policy Issues 
in Economics Development. London, 1969 and L.G. Reynolds, "Relative 
Earnings and Manpower Allocation in Developing Countries," . Pakistan 
Development Review, Spring' 1969, pp. 14-34. 
government, permits relatively free collective bargaining between ; 
unions and managements, it is very likely that the wage rate in 
unionized industries will be driven up above that prevailing in . 
nonunionized industries, and the union wage level will obviously be 
greater than the market clearing wage in the modern sector- Whether 
this.is sufficient to. generate unemployment in the Harris-Todaro sense 
depends, on the effect of the high union .wage on the nonunion wage, level. 
If employers..of nonunion labor do,not perceive that they are threat-
ened by. unionization of their workers, and are not otherwise forced or 
motivated, to pay a higher wage than is justified by market conditions, 
the wage in nonunion industries of the modern sector will fall below 
:the agricultural wage (after adjustment has been made:for differences 
in the cost of living), 1 0 and full employment, with a "distorted." 
wage structure,-will_still" prevail after a per-'od of adjustment . On 
the other hand, there are some reasons for supposing the level of 
the union wage may influence the nonunion wage directly. 0n-_ of 
these is the "threat effect" hypothesis. 1 1 As the union/nonunion, wage 
differential increases, the probability that a majority of:the workers 
10 - Ignoring differences in living costs, nonpecuniary attributes, e^d 
• hours•of xrork, labor market equilibrium will be established when 
W Q +W (1--Q ) = W , where W .. W , and W are the i-ge levels for u u n u a u' n a 
union, nonunion, and agricultural workers, respectively, and Q is 
an index, of the probability, appropriately discounted, of obtaining 
employment in the unionized sector. If W is set greater than then W 
it then follows that the equilibrium wageuin the nonunion sector 
will be less tf -m the wage in agriculture, so long as Q >0. Q will 
depend positively on the rate of growth of total employment u 
snd the rrte of labor turnover in unionized industries as well as 
the relative size of the unionized branch of the modern sector. For 
an e'yoosition of this approach see my "The Structure of Rural-Urban 
Migration. Models,East African Economic, Review., forthcoming June 
1971. 
11 - See S. Rosen, ''Trade Union Power, Threat Effects and the Extent of 
Organization," Review of Economic Studies, April 1969, pp. 135-95. 
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in the typical nonunion firm will be motivated to change their status will 
also: increase. A profit maximizing employer will therefore attempt to 
keep his wage offer in line with the union wage, less but not too much 
so. -ThiS'•''implies, of course, that the wage level in the nonunion branch 
of the -modern sector will not fall to that leVel which would equate the 
demand for and supply of labor in the modern sector. 
(2) Government as Employer. In most lesser developed countries 
a fairly large fraction of wage earners are government employees, and 
it is quite possible that the government arbitrarily sets a wage level for 
its employees which is higher than is dictated by market conditions. 
Civil servants compose an articulate and potentially troublesome minority 
from-the point of view of the incumbent government, and it is not difficult 
to imagine that the.-government will try to "bribe1'1 them into submission 
and cooperation. In addition, decisions concerning'government salary 
levels may be made by the bureaucrats'themselves, which would be unlikely 
to result in systematid biases on the low side of the market wage. 
'•• (3) Legal and Social Mihumum Wages. To the extent that the govern-
ment Enforces its code of statutory minimum wage levels, a floor may 
be established on nonunion v»age levels, a floor may be established on , 
nonunion wage levels which will have the effect of attracting too many 
people to urban areas. There -may be other reasons why the nonunion 
wage level does not adjust to a very low level. First, the individual 
productivity of workers may depend on either the real wage the employer 
pays (through its effect on the worker's health and nutrition) or the 
wage the employer offers relative to offers by other firms.(because 
of ''morale" effects). By either version of the efficiency wage'hypothesis 
the firm may find, it profitable ..to increase Its wage offer to a; point 
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beyond that at which it can just fill all its positions. In fact, 
the profit maximizing wage is determined by setting the elasticity 
of labour efficiently with respect to the wage equal to unity. By 
the healthrproductivity variant of the model variant of the model, 
firms are likely to establish minimum real wages which are independent 
of the wage level prevailing in the union or government sectors. 
By the morale effect variant the wage in the nonunion branch of the 
modern sector should be geared to that prevailing in union and gov-
ernment empl'oym nt, which is roughly the same as is predicted by 
the threat effect model. 
Second, decision makers in firms may derive utility from 
,v' • • - ' ' • 
paying wages which are high m either a relative or an absolute sense, 
which implies that they are willing to sacrifice some of their 
profits'in order to pay higher wages. This behc.-.:. . ur wc^ld most 
likely apply to firms which are owned and managed by foreigners, for 
foreigners may not want to be known as"exploiters; of local labour. 
If' firms have the same (well behaved) trade of between porfits and 
wages, it can be shown that firms in which the production process 
is more capital intensive will be more likely to pay high wages than 
more labor intensive firms (because the cost of high wages is lower 
for the former). This paternalism factor makes much the same 
suggestion as the efficiency model, namely that the wage level in 
the nonunion branch of the modern sector may not fall to its market 
clearing level. 
Another possibility concerns the impact of potential labor 
mobility on the desired wage level of the typical firm. In most 
underdeveloped economics the bulk of the labor force has very strong 
ties with rural areas , and very often an individual will quit a 
good job in the modern 
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sector in order to go back to his home area for a year or two. 
In order to counter this problem and minimize total labor costs (wages 
plus training costs) firms may offer very high wage rates compared 
to rural wages, and this can result in substantial urban unemployment 
12 
even though there are no institutional imperfections such as unions*-
To the extent that this phenomenon is important in the modern sector, 
it also complicates the interpretation of union/nonunion wage differen-
tials, for the costs of labor turnover may.be different for union and 
nonunion firms. 
The Murky Sector. Even if a migrant cannot find employment in 
either the high or relatively high tranches of the modernsector, there 
is still a large class of opportunities for small-scale self employment 
in the urban area. Much of this activity in the ''murky" sector requires 
no capital and is not subject to any barriers, to entry3 so one would 13 
expect the forces of competition to work nere. To the extent that, 
a new urban in-migrant has some chance of. eventually obtaining employment 
in the modern sector, the returns to the labor of petty capitalists 
should be less than the equivalent in agriculture. On the other hand, 
if there is only a very small chance that an individual can crack into 
the modern sector, returns to the urban self employed and to agricultural 
labor (after adjusting, of course, for differences in labor quality) 
should be about the same. 
12 - J. Stiglitz is exploring some of the implications of this model 
in. a paper in progress. 
13 - Various theoretical implications of the existence of a murky aire1 
explored in D. Mazumdar, "The Theory of Urban Unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries Makerere .University working paper, 1970. 
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Testable Implications. By including the type of employment 
activity of the individual as an explanatory variable it is possible 
to estimate the relative pecuniary advantages accruing to those working 
in a unionised private industry or for the government relative to 
each other and those who work in private employment in the modern 
sector. It is also possible to estimate the returns to the self 
employed relative to other groups, The results of such an excercise 
will provide some insight into the va.~ " lity of the various hypotheses 
concerning the structure of wages we have set out. For example, if _ • 
government workers receive more "than union workers in private in-
dustry - holdixig' qualifications constant - the government as employer 
hypothesis would be supported, the unionism hypothesis refuted. 
• A convenient method for performing tests of this sort is to set 
up the regression model in the form 
log W = a U + a G a„U*G + a S + . . . , 
X 2. o 4-
where W is the wage rate the individual, receives;, U, a- dummy variable 
which is one if the individual is a-, union member and •.zero i . he:, is not, 
G is a dummy variable reflecting government..-employment, S, a dummy ; 
variable reflecting self employment status-, and where 3 of: courseall 
other- variables influencing wages are ..included. The interaction term, 
U*G, would be included to allow, for the,possibility that unions . infZ"ence 
the wages of government workers to a different extent ^hat those who 
are employed in private industries• The coefficient a^ represents 
the logarithm of the difference between the wages of union and nonunion 
workers m private employment. Hence ., W^/W^ = e , and the proportion-
ate .wage advantage uue to un -tori- membership status is 
-12-
• ai (tf -W )/W = e - 1. u n n 
The wage of government workers relative to unionized workers in 
private industries is e • x 9 of the. self employed relative, to ^ 
' % nonunion workers in private industries e 9 and so forth. . 
Tp test the set of hypotheses which predict that, there is. 
a floor to the wage rate in nonunion industries in. the modern sec-
tors one would see if a .the. coefficient on. self employment; status , 
is significantly less than zero. If a = 0.?. i.a, .W -=• Wg)- it is. 
then fairly clear that there are np barriers to the nonunion.private 
wage level falling to . its competitive, level-. This test, however,, 
is open to the "alibi that self employment yields, a nonpecuniary 
advantage to individuals because of the associated independence from 
externally imposed hours, pace of work, and.the .like-..,. This argument 
would also imply a negative value of a . 
(d) Discrimination 
Im inost societies females are at a disadvantage in the labor 
• market relative to males', in part because mo'st employers are males. 
If this is so, females will receive lower wages than males, other factors 
held constant. For the typical African country the other major 
possibility for discrimination is oh ethnic grounds, i.e. by tribe. 
To test for any such possibilities the regression model can include 
one-zero dummy variables for sex and tribal affiliation, say-
log W = b1F H- b2Ti + b3T2 + . .. s 
where.-F indicates1 female, .T^ membership in a particular tribe and T^ 
membership in another,;and'where again-,, the other variables are also 
included in the regression. The estimated wage of females relative 
Is 
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to males is e , of tribe 1 relative to tribe 2 e -- -„_~ There are 
other possible.interpretations of these coefficients besides pure 
labor market discrimination. , A .significantly negative value- Of1 b 
for example.;, is also consistent with the hypothesis that females 
as 
are simply not/productive as males even when educational and other 
qualifications are identical, .- In order for labor market discrimination 
to take place5 all employers must derive utility from employing one-
group over another - in this case they must be willing to sacrifice 
some..of their profits rn .order to employ males instead of females, 
members of one tribe rather than another. If there is a fairly large 
class of employers who do not have such tastes and desire only to 
maximize profits, a negative value of. b^ would not represent labor 
market discrimination, for- in the absence of quality differences among 
groups-in. the work force the forces.. .of competition would drive relative 
wages to equality. 
There, is another type.of discrimination in the labor-market, that 
JL@ 
due .:to discrimination by employees rather than • ."nployert;. This 
seems most relevant in the•African cases•for members of one ^ibe are 
somewhat reluctant in many Instances to work with members .of another 
tribe. Employers, on.the other hand,.may not .really care if an employee 
is from one tribe or another. If the tribes are-mixed in a particular 
workplace., however, productivity may fall because of friction or poor 
communication. The .employer therefore; hires only members of a"single 
tribe. Marginal firms will hire members of that tribe, with • the lowest 
wage rate, ana this would tend to equalize wages by tribev 
14 - For the original analysis of the economic implications of various 
types of discrimination see G.S. Becker, The Economics of. Pis- . 
crimination, Chicago1957. 
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II. Empirical Results 
In the Spring of 1971 an intensive household survey of Africans 
in Nairobi was conducted by the Institute for Development Studies 
under the auspices of the Nairobi City Council. The sample was confined 
to low and.middle income areas of the city, which does not create much 
of a bias because most residents of high income areas are Asians and 
Europeans. The. survey instrument contained a battery of questions on 
invariabies 
basic socio-economiq/which provided sufficient information to estimate 
an earnings function of the sort discussed in. Section I. The sample used 
in this paper consists of all respondents who received some wage income 
in Nairobi during 1970, and the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
of the wage rate (measured in Cents Kenya) per hour of work' for the 
15 
respondent's modal work activity;in 1970. The principal reason that 
we chose to explain wage rather than income differences among individuals 
is that a large part of the sample worked less than full time, and income 
earned per month is of course very.sensitive to this. The wage rate, 
on the other hand, is a measure of an.individual's earning capacity.:or 
stock of human.capital. It,would be very interesting for•a country like 
Kenya to explain differences in incomes, for a year for the entire 
adult population., for this would provide information on the. determinants 
of unemployment and underemployment as well as wages. This, however, 
would require a national probability samples for.a large fraction of 
individuals who desire employment in the modern sector are forced to 16 spend much of their time in rural, areas. 
15 - Wage incomes are adjusted to include direct allowances, but no 
attempt was made to adjust for the value of free housing in the 
cases in which it was provided. 
16 - For ,..a more thorough discussion of this , view of labor .market behavior 
see my "Wages, Employments and Income Distribution in Kenya,," Insti-
tute for Development Studies, 1971. 
-15-
The specification of the earnings function is 
log W = oE» + 8 A + S A2 + 8„ARR + 3, U + f3 G + g UxG 1 2 o 4 - 5 6 
.+ 8 .S + B E r yTRE + 8 + e, — " / o' O 
where 
E': Vector of educational dummy variables 
A: Age of respondent 
ARR: Age arrived in Nairobi 
U: Union member 
G: Government employee 
S: Self employed 
F: Fetuale 
TRB: Vector of tribal dummy variables. 
The level of educational attainment is entered in categoric rather than 
metric form to allow for the possibility that the effect of eduvation 
on wages may not be "smooth.1' The principal cutoff points in Kenya 
are seven (primary) and eleven (secondary) years of schooling, and 
one might expect the marginal effect of a year of schooling on earnings 
potential to be much greater for, say, the seventh year than for the 
fifth or sixth. The coefficients on age and age squared, g^ and 82s 
should be positive and negative, respectively, reflecting the earlier 
discussion of human capital accumulation over the life eye."1 The 
coefficient on ARR should be negative, for it is the negative of the 
annual increment to an individual's stock of human capital due to 
residing in Nairobi. Expectations concerning the signs and values of 
8, s 8c> 8es and R „ the coefficients on the type of employment activity 4 0 C / 
variables, were discussed fairly thoroughly in the previous section, 
as was the interpretation of the coefficient on F. Fc-\r tribes, Kikuyu, 
Kamba, Luo, and Luhya, were selected for inclusion in the regression 
equation, for they together represent 93 per cent of the sample The 
coefficient on each 'hould be interpreted as the proportionate deviation 
-16- ' 
Table 1. 
Determinants of Hourly Earnings 
in Urban Kenya. 1970 a 
Variable (1) Education Categoric (2) Education Metric 
Educ. 1-3 .155 (.058) 
" 4-6 .317 (.050) 
^ 7 : .550 (.054) 
" 3-10 1.013 (.066) 
11 1.535 (.078) 
" 12+ 1.818 (.208) 
E :oio (.014) 
„2 b .011 (.001) 
A .083 (.009) .086 ( .009) 
A2 -.00079 (.00011) -.00080 (.00011) 
ARR -.013 (.002) -.013 (i002) 
• U . ..,274 (.041) . ,265 (.041) 
G .165 (.053) .153 (.053) 
rJxG ' -.178 (.071) -.164 (.070) 
S ' -.717 (.064) -.725 (.063) 
F • -.238 (.,054) -.,208 (.054) 
KIK -.112 (.065) -.091 (.065) 
KAM -.036 (.071) -.001 (.073) 
LUO .008 ( .073) .024 (.073) 
LUH .112 (,076) < .133 (.076) 
Const. 2.83 (.185) . 2.75 (,184) 
, R2 • .490 .491 . 
a - Estimated standar 
beside estimated 
d errors of regression coefficients 
coefficients. 
in parentheses 
of the earnings of the particular tribe.from those of "others"-(minor 
Kenya tribes and a scattering of individuals from Tanzania,•Uganda, Ethiopia, 
the Congo, and Sudan), other things equal.. 
The initial results for a sample of 1254- individuals are presented 
in Table 1, and the tightness of the fit indeed confirms the notion 
that the wage structure in urban Kenya can be explained by a set of 
socio-economic variables. The results are best interpreted one: set of - b 
variables at a time. 
Education 
The.single most important variable explaining the logarithm of 
an individual's hourly earning is his level of educational attainment 
(the simple correlation coefficient between log W and E, measured in years, 
is .4-27). Two regressions are presented in Table 1, (1) which enters 
education in categoric form and (2) which enters education in metric 
form with a quadratic. There is little, to choose between the alternative 
forms, for the categoric case appears to be well represented by the 
second degree polynomial in E. When education is entered in both 
categoric and metric forms, a regression which is not reported, all 
of the coefficients associated with education become insignificant due 
to rnulticolinearity, which one would expect from (1) and (2j. The 
coefficients on the other variables are little effectau by the way 
education is entered into the regression. . - - -
We will first discuss the categoric results, equation (1), for 
the coefficients, which represent-logarithmic deviations of the parti.ular 
educational category from a zero level of formal educational attainment 
:are more easily interpreted. The results indicate an acreasing marginal 
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proportionate effect of education on" wages as the educational level 
18 is increased. Table 2 presents the percentage earnings advantage 
due to moving from a particular educational category to each higher 
19 
one. IThe category 12+ was excluded from this table because of the 
paucity of observations in this range.) The underscored figures are the 
percentage increases due to moving to the next highest category. Taking 
the midpoint of each category (2 for 1-33 etc.), the average percentage 
increment due to a year of schooling are 8.5 for 0 to 2, 6 for 2 to 5, 
13.5 for 5 to 7, 29.5 for 7 to 9, and 34.0 for 9 to 11. As pointed 
out in. fn. 6, this.is a rough measure of the conventional rate of return 
to schooling when out-of-pocket (or out-of-treasury, for the:social rate) 
costs are ignored. It should be pointed out that;if the conventional rate 
Table 2. 
Estimated Perceritage Increases in Potential 
Hourly Earnings Due to Moving from Lower 
• to Higher Degrees of Educational Attainment 
- • TO 
2 r w> 7 9 11 
17 38 73 175 366 n 
18; 49 136 297 2 F 
27 101 287 5 R 
59 169 7 0 M 
68 9 
18 - Increasing returns to education, at least through secondary school, 
are not uncommon for underdeveloped countries. See, for example, 
Martin Carnoy., "Earnings and ..Schooling. in Mexico," Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, July 1967, pp. 408-19. 
19 - For eample , the estimated value of log Wi. , - log W = 1.54, so 
1.54 
W l l/W 0 = e "" = 4.65. The percentage increment: due to. moving from 
0 to 11 years of schooling is then 100x(4.66 - 1) = 366. 
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of return to schooling had any especial significance in Kenya it 
would be incumbent upon us to work out more sophisticated estimates 
of the structure of returns. This would involve obtaing figures for 
private and social costs at various levels of E and equating present 
values by iteration. However, as was noted earlier, the probability 
of obtaining a job in the modern sector versus either a position in 
agriculture or unemployment, as well as estimates of the effect of 
education on productivity in agriculture, are neccesary to calculate 
meaningful estimates. The figures in Table 2 are thus interesting 
from the point of view of the distribution of income rather than educational 
policy. 
Increasing marginal returns to schooling are . also indicated 
by equation (2). The estimated effect of education on wages is given 
by 3(log W)/SE'= .010 + .022E. The t test for the hypothesis that 
the second derivative of log W with'respect to E is positive is simply 
2 
twice the coefficient on E divided by its standard error, which yields 
a t value in excess of 20. In discussion of the results on the other 
determinants of wages in this section, the estimates from equation (2) 
will be used. 
The enormous wage advantage accruing to .. ployed persons with some 
secondary schooling helps to explain the serious unemployment problem 
20 
Kenya is currently facing with secondary school leavers. On the one 
hand, the huge wage advantage of secondary over primary school graduates, 
169 per cent, means that it is well worth the student's time to finish 
his studies even if there is a very good chance that he will not obtain 
the kind, of job for which he is qualified.. Similarly, since education is 
20 - On this problem see P. Kinyanjui, "The Education, .raining and Unemploy-
ment of Kenya Secondary School Leavers," I.D.S. working paper, May 1971. 
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the prinicipal route to success in the society, there is also strong 
pressure on the government by the citizenry to increase the capacity 
of the school system. On the other hand, the high wage differential 
will lower the expansion (in absolute terms) of the number of new jobs 
in the economy suitable for school leavers. An employer will require 
a secondary over a primary school graduate only if the efficiency of 
the former is at least 161 per cent greater than the latter®s. In a 
capital-poor country like Kenya, there cannot be expected to be many such 
positions. Thus, unless the wage differential between educational 
categories can be reduced, the problem of unemployed school, leavers 
21 is likely to get worse. 
Age and Age Arrived in Nairobi 
The coefficients on age and age squared are each quite significant, 
having the expected positive and negative, signs, respectively, ana the 
coefficient on the age at which the individual arrived in Nairobi is also 
significant in the expected negative direction. For a person who arrived 
in Nairobi at a certain age, the effect on the potential wage rate, is 
given by 9(log W)/9A = .073 - .00160A, for the coefficient on .ARR must 
be added to the coefficient on A in order to give the total effect of age. 
This implies that wage rates reach a maximum in cross-sectional terms at 
about age 46. The predicted difference in the logarithm of the wage rate 
of a worker 46 years old and one 22 years old is .446, which means that the 
older makes about 56 per cent more than the younger worker. This is very 
21 - It is a very interesting question whether the existence of large 
unemployment rates -for school leavers will reduce the demand for 
education in the future. It is also interesting to speculate why 
unemployed school leavers do not return to agriculture, at least 
during peak periods of farming activity, as those with less schooling 
do. One possibility, which was suggested by my colleague L.D. Smith, 
is;that unemployed secondary school leavers are in debt to their 
families or other persons in the villages and cannot yet admit failure. 
. . . . 22 similar to the equivalent differential for the United States. 
The coefficient on ARR implies that for each year a worker 
has resided in Nairobi his potential wage increases by 1.3 per cent. 
This result probably reflects two factors. First, to some extent the 
coefficient picks up the ''acculturation" effect discussed in Section 
Is which was the a priori justification for including the variable 
in the regression in the first place (and for including the question 
in the survey instrument). Second, and perhaps more important, the length 
of time an individual has been in Nairobi represents the number of years 
the individual has been able to search for the best jobs available to 
him, and, hence, in a probabilistic sense it is a measure of his 
suceess. Furthermore, in line with the discussion of the probable effects 
of education in Section I, increased supplies .of educated labor have 
caused employers to increase hiring standards of jobs with given attributes, 
which makes it increasingly difficult for successive series of new entrants 
into the labor force to obtain high-paying positions given their quali-
fications. . ... 
Type of Employment 
The results on U. G, UxG, and S indicate that the type of employment 
activity in which the individual is engaged is an impo:. ':ant determinant 
of his earning capacity. Each of the coefficients on'these variables should 
be interpreted as the logarithmic deviation of the wage for ""hat type 
22 - The estimated wage of a 46 year old worker relative to that of a 
22 year old worker was. estimated to be 1.73 in the U.S. from the 
regression equation in Johnson and Stafford, o£_. cit. , which is 
somewhat higher than the'estimate from equation (2). However, when 
the effect of age is is estimated separately for the employed and the 
self-employed, as is done in Section Illm the estimated age;46/age 22 
differential becomes 1.74, which is virtually identical with the 
U.S. result. 
-22-
Tabie : 3.'"' 
Estimated Differences of Logarithm 
of Wages for Workers in Alternative 
Types of Employment 
ADVANTAGE OF: 
>nunion Nonunion Union Union 
Private Government Government Private 
.725 .873 .979 .990 Self 
.063) (.074) ( .068) ( .062) 
.153 .254 .265 Nonun. 
( .053) (.050) (.041) Priv. 0 v 
.101 '.112 Nonun. E 
( .050) (.054) Govt. R 
.011 Union 
r *- • ,': (.047). Govt. 
of activity from that of nonunion workers in private industries, the 
excluded category,'after'other things are taken into account. The 
estimated advantage of each group over each other and the associated 
23 • • .standard error are shown in Table 3, and each of these differences 
except that between unionists in public and private employment is 
significantly different from zero at conventionally acceptable confidence 
levels. 
Table 4- presents indeces. of estimated .hourly earnings by type 
of employment activity in relation to nonunion employees in private 
industries and the percentage of- the sample in- each category. These 
23 - Since log W = 8 U + 3rG,+. 3KUxG + ..., the estimated wage advantage 
of, say, unionists in the private sector over nonunion government 
workers is. 3, - 8C> and its estimated standard error is 4 o 
{V( 3.,) + V(3r) - 2C0V( 3. 4 5 . 4 o 
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Table 4. 
Indeces of Estimated Hourly 
by Type of Employment; 
Employment Type . Index . % of Sample 
Private Nonunion 100 25.1 
!i Union 130 39.0 
Government Nonunion 116 9 .7 
" Union 129 16.7 
Self Employed 48 9.5 
results demonstrate that there is a large union/nonunion wage differential 
in Kenya, a wage advantage of 30 per cent in private industries ana 11 
per cent in government employment. It is interesting to note that estimates 
of the union wage advantage, for private industries from similar data 
• •• 24 sets range from 28 to 34 per cent, and these are within a single standard 
error of the estimate for Kenya. Nonunion workers in government earn 16 
per cent more than their counterparts in private industries. Now all this 
suggests that both the unionism and government-as-employer hypotheses 
concerning the high wage level in the modern sector are relevant for Kenya. 
with the former perhaps being more important.; 
At the same time, wages of nonunion workers in private industries 
are more than twice the hourly earnings of the self employed, which is 
consistent with the different wage models which predict a floor to the 
wages'received by nonunion employees - threat c "Cects, legal minimum wages, 
productivity effects, and paternalistic wage setting. It is, unfortunately, 
not, possible with this data set to test between these, for they each 
24 - See L.W. Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings," American Economic 
Review, March 1966,;. pp. 96-117; F.P. Stafford, "Concentration and 
Labor Earnings: Comment," American Economic Review, March 1958, pp. 
174-81; and G.E. Johnson and K.C. Youmans, "Union Relative Wage Effects 
by Age and Education," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January 
1971, pp. 171-79. 
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predict the same thing., i.e. W^ > W . It is also rather difficult 
to test the prediction that the wage level for the self employed will 
he no greater than the wage level in agriculture, -for, although there 
are no official statistics, the cost of living is much greater in Nairobi 
than in the countryside. The predicted hourly earnings of.a typical 
(i.e., the mean values of the other variables: A =33, E = 5, ARR = 20, 
and from the "other" tribal classification) male in self employment is 
/ v 25 46 cents (K), and the customary wage m agriculture is about 38 cents. 
Real wages are then equal if the urban cost of living is 21 per cent greater 
than the rural cost of living, and it is generally believed that 21 per 
26 
cent understates the difference. Thus, although we can make no claims 
for the precision of the supportive statistics, it appears .that the self 
employed do not earn much more than individuals in agriculture.. 
Discrimination 
Females in Nairobi earn 19 per cent less than males (males earn • 
22 per cent more), observable qualifications.held constant. To-what 
extent this is due to discrimination and to what extent it is due: to lower 
productivity .on the part of females is an open question. In the United Stated 
25 - For comparative purposes, the predicted wage of this mean individual 
in private nonunion employment is 97 cents and 125 cents in private 
union employment. In 1970 100 cents (K) - $.14 (US) = 5.8 p (UK)., 
26 - There are many problems in performing urban-rural wage comparisons, 
some of which I have gone into in my "Wages, Employment, . . op. 
cit.. The major ones of these include the seasonality of work 
activity in agriculture, nonpecuniary ,differences with respect to •'• 
location and different types of work, and the fact that a fairly 
substantial portion of the typical urban income recipient's earnings 
are remitted to his home area. W.E. Whitelaw ..*•' . v. _/-_< 
;" in the estimation of- a "remittances'' function" with the data, set 
employed in the present study. 
the wage disadvantage of females is between 25 and 30 per cent, de-
pending on age and education. This is to a large extent explained by the 
fact that females generally drop out of the labor force (or are expected 
to do so) in order to raise families during the period of maximum human 
capital formation. This type of labor supply behavior is not so common 
in Kenya. An additional source of earnings differentials between females 
and males concerns the differential incidence of the various types of 
employment. For this sample, 35.3 per cent of females were union members 
as compared with 58.3 per cent of males, and 26.6 per cent of females were 
self employed as compared with b .'3 per cent of males. (The incidence of 
U and U*G was essentially the same for the sexes.) Now the regression 
equation accounted for the influences of union membership and self employ-
ment status on wages, and it is interesting to find out how much additional 
'•'discrimination'' can be accounted for by these two differences. One rather 
crude way is to multiply the difference; between the proportions of the 
sexes in each category times the appropriate estimated effect of that 
category on wages from equation (2). (It is rough because it is not possible 
to calculate standard errors of the total earnings differential estimated 
in this fashion.) This implies that because of the institution of union-
ism : the difference between the logarithm of female and bale'wages is" 
changed by .265x(.'353 - .583) = - .061. Similarly, the greater incidence 
of self employment changes the estimated value of log' W^ . - log W^ by 
- .725*(.266 - .068) = - .144. These effects : ^ether just about equal 
the direct effect of F on log W, and adding these to to the direct coef-
ficient implies that the earnings disadvantage of females re- tive to males 
is about 40 per cent. 
With respect to the tribal dummies it is most interesting' to look 
at differences among the four major tribes, for these represent 93 per cent 
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of the total sample. The estimated logarithmic differences in wages 
by tribe - after other differences are taken into account - are shown 
in Table 5. The most interesting result is that Kikuyus, the largest 
tribe in Kenya and the politically dominant one, earn significantly 
less than each of the other three. 
There are two principle alternative (although not mutually 
exclusive)-explanations of this. First, Kikuyus may be discriminated 
against by employers, for employers, who are generally Asians 
Table 5. 
Estimated Differences in Logarithm 
of Wages by Major Tribe 
:ADVANTAGE: OF: 





and Europeans,and who may resent Kikuyus for their role in the independence 
movement of the 1950's. Another variant of this approach is based 
on the fact that a large number of the major firms in Nairobi x^ ere 
formed or expanded significantly during the 1950's, a time in which 
the movement of Kikuyus into Nairobi was restricted by the. colonial 
authorities. These high wage firms were::thus staffed by members of 
other tribes, and, because members of particular tribes- prefer to Work 
with their ''own people" (the, employee discrimination model), Kikuyus 
have on average tended to be excluded: from the better jobs. 
.224 KIK 
(.052) 0 





Second, the Kikuyu areas in Kenya are slightly closer and are 
quite a hit more accessible to Nairobi than the Kamba areas , and they 
are much more so than the Luo and Luhya areas, which are in the Western 
part of Kenya. Since practically all the respondents have retained their 
27 
rural ties, this would imply that the reservation price for prolonged 
residence in Nairobi would be lower for Kikuyus than for Kambas than 
for the Luo or Luhya. In other words, a Luo who was not fortunate enough 
to obtain a good job in Nairobi within a certain period of time would 
be more likely to go back to his home area than would a Kikuyu, for the 
disutility of being in Nairobi is greater for the former than the latter. 
Consistent with tnis interpretation is the fact that the ratio of the 
fraction of the Nairobi population which is" Kikuyu to the equivalent 
fraction for the nation is 1.78, whereas it is 1.34 for Kambas and 1.08 
and 1.17 for Luos and Luhyas, respectively. It should be stressed, 
however, that this economic interpretation of tribal differentials does 
not rule out a discrimination explanation at the same time; the two 
are not mutually exclusive. 
III. Effect of Human Capital Variables on the Returns to the Self Employed 
A rather important social question in Kenya and most other 
LDC's concerns what to do with the educated unemployed. If large numbers 
of primary and secondary school leavers cannot find employment in the 
modern sector of the economy, they will be forced to move into agriculture 
or urban self employment. This suggests a question: ... what extent 
does education increase the earnings capacity of individuals outside 
\ 
27 - Rural ties are retained in the sense that individuals own or expect 
to inherit land in their home areas; wives are left, in the home 
area, and the urban'worker remits a portion of his.income to the 
rural area for. support of his family. -
28 - Republic of Kenya, Census of Population, 1969, vol. I. 
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the modern sector? 
The IDSUS data are obviously of no help in attacking the returns 
29 
to education m the agricultural sector question, but it can oe 
employed to answer the question for petty capitalists in urban areas. 
By adding interaction terms between the human capital variables 
and the dummy variable for self employment status to the other variables 
in equation (2), that is 
2 ' ' 2 2 ' log W = a E + .a E + a £xS + a k xS t 1 A f g A + AxS . 
.. • • L • -1 2. • • ji- 2 -L ' • 2 -L' 
<2 • ' ' " T 3 A xS + $ ARR + g ARRxS + 
2. O o 
one can test whether the huirian capital variables, individually and in 
concert, influence the earnings of the self.employed differently from 
the way they influence the earnings of those individuals employed by 
business-^firms and the government. The results of such a-test are 
shown in Table 5. (The coefficients on the other variables are little 
changed by the introduction of the interaction terms and are thus not 
reported.) For comparative purposes the corresponding results from 
equation (2) are also shown. The null hypothesis that the effect of 
the human capital variables on the earnings of the two groups, the self 
employed and employees, is the same is decisively refuted (F = 7.79)^ , 
which is to say that the increase in the variance explained is worth 
the loss of five degrees of freedom. 
The estimated effect of education on trie earnings of the self 
employed is c^ + a + 2(a2 + «2)E = .020 + .002E, which is less than 
29 - For a very interesting attempt to estimate the effect of :schooling 
on earnings in the agricultural sedtor of; an'-LDC see Alberto Valdes E., 
"Wages and Schooling of Agricultural Workers' in Chile ,'" Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, January 1971, pp. 313-29. 
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Table 6 
Effects of Introducing 
Interaction between Human 
Capital Variables and Self 
Employment Status 
Interactive Model Equation (2) 
Coefficient Coefficient on 
Variable on Variable Interaction Term 
E .021 -.001 .010 
( .015) (.006) (.014) 
£ 2 ; • .011 -.010 • Oil 
(.001) ( .007) (.001) 
A . .096 -.074 .086 
(.009) ( .029) ( .009) 
A2 ' ^ -.00093 .00095 - .00080 
(.00014) . (.00034) (..00011) 
ARR -.010 - ,030 -.013 
i ( .002) :. . (.007) • ': j. j lc: ( .002) 
S 1.47 - - .725 
(.56) : (.063) 
> . .507 .491 
table 7. "i 
Estimated'-. Derivative of log W with Respect 
to E for Employees, Self Employed, and Difference 
E Employees Self Employed Difference 
1 .043 .013 .030 
(.028) (.043) ( .045) 
4 .109. ... ... .019 .090, 
( .026) (.022) ( .024) 
7 .175 .025) .150 
(.026) ( .058) ( .060) 
11 .263 .033 .230 
( .030) (.118) ( .120) 
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the estimated effect for employees. a + 2a.2E = .021 + .022E, for all 
values of E. The estimated influence of E on the logarithm of the wage 
rate and the associated estimated standard errors for employees, the 
self employed, and the differential effect of education on the two 
groups for selected values of E is shown in Table 7. The most interesting 
result is that whereas the estimate of 3(log W)/aE is significantly 
greater than zero for E >. 2 for employees it is not so for any value 
of E for the self employed. The estimated difference in the effect 
of education cn the earnings of the two groups is significant fcr E > 3. 
The interaction results also suggest that there is no relation 
between wages and age for,the self employed. The derivative of log W 
with respect to A is - .018 + .00004A for the."self employed, which is 
negative for all relevant Values of A, but its standard error is always 
at least as great as its value. For employees, on the other hand, the 
estimated value of 9(log W)/9A is significantly positive for A < 43 and 
significantly negative for A > 50. (W is highest in a relative sense 
it A = 46.) The effect of the age arrived in Nairobi variable, however, 
is significantly greater for the self employed than for employees. This 
most likely represents a selection effect. Individuals who are successful 
petty capitalists - for whatever the reason"- will tend to stay in this 
occupation. Those who are less successful will search harder for 
a job or return to their home areas to work in agriculture. 
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IV. 3u -_u.ry and Conclusions 
The principal empirical findings of this study of wages in Kenya's 
modern sector can he summarized as follows: 
(1) There is an increasing marginal proportionate effect of education 
on potential earnings of individuals from 0 through 11 years of 
schooling. The estimated derivative of the logarithm of the wage with 
respect-to education increases from .010 at E = 0 to ,252 at E = 11. 
This is very difficult to justify economically since there is a surplus 
of educated labor in Kenya. 
(2) The effect of age on earnings in Kenya is quite Similar to that in 
developed; countries. Relative wages rise with age until age U6 and fall 
thereafter.. The: age .at which the individual migrated to Nairobi also 
has a negative..effect on earnings, which probably mainly' reflects the 
combination of seniority systems and increasing supplies of would-be entrants 
to the modern, sector. "" •.' •• 
(3) Union wages are estimated to be 30 per cent greater than--nonunion 
wages in private industries and 11 per cent greater in government em-
ployment, other things held constant, For nonunion workers government 
employment increases wages by 16 per cent. The results appear to be most 
consistent with the view that unionism- is the principal cause of high wages 
in the modern sector of Kenya. 
(U) At the sane time, the nonunion wage level in private industries is 
more .than twice.the hourly returns for the self employed, which suggests 
in turn that even the nonunion labor market is in disequilibrium with 
respect to the rural wage level. 
(5) The earnings of females in Nairobi are on-average 1, _er cent lower 
than those .of-males, ...other observable factors constant. Females, 
hpwever, tend to work :in nonunion occupations and to be self employed 
to a greater extent than males, both of which factors exacerbate 
the earnings disadvantage of females, and upon adding the effect of 
these to the differental, the wage disadvantage of females rises to 
forty per cent. 
(6) Earnings of members.of the largest tribe in Kenya, the Kikuyu, 
are significantly less than any of the other three major tribes., which 
is consistent with an interpretation of the. existence of one or another 
discriminatory practices against them. This result, however, is also 
consistent with simple migration theory, for the home areas of the Kikuyu 
are closest to Nairobi, of any .of the tribes. 
(7) The effect of the human capital variables, age and. education, is 
systematically different for the self employed and employees-.' This suggest 
that petty capitalism is an alternative to the modern, sector cnly for 
the relatively uneducated. 
In conclusion, it seems appropriate to stress the usefulness of 
the periodic gathering of data sets comparable to this one for different 
countries. If such a data set had been available for Kenya in, say, 1965, 
we would have been able to..evaluate the trends in the returns to education, 
the relat.on between earnings and age, advantages to union membership, 
and so forth. This would have permitted, the testing of a wider range 
of hypotheses than was possible with this single cross-section. For 
example, with data for two time periods one could answer the question 
of whether the government wage level leads or lags the. private industry 
union wage level. Another set of questions which could be attacked 
concerns the changes in educational qualifications- for': entry into ;the ' 
better jobs in the modern sector. We would also like to point out that 
future surveys could,profitably obtain certain types of information which 
were not. included in the IDSUS survey. First, it is important to obtain 
as much information on the background of the individual as possible, 
the occupation of the father, the size of the community in which the 
individual, grew up, the number of older and younger brothers and 
sisters, and so forth. The importance of particular indicators of 
background varies among countries, of course, and the, selection of 
the "optimal'' set requires knowledge of both the techniques of eco-
nomic analysis and the culture of the particular country, but inclusion 
of such variables would aid the estimation of the effect of variables 
like those included in this study. Second, recent developments in 
human capital theory have stressed the importance of post-formal training 
in the accumulation of individual human capital. This is probably 
even more important in LDC's than in developed economies. Accordingly, 
future surveys should attempt to find out as much as possible about 
on-th-job training, occupational history, and formal technical training 
of individuals. 
It would be very interesting to contrast the results of similar 
studies to this one for a number of different countries (and, where 
appropriate, different urban areas within specific countries). This would 
permit the analysis of the effects of various institutional differences -
with respect to the stage of economic development, type of economic 
and political organisation, racial and ethnic homogeneity, and other 
cultural delineations - among countries on labor market behavior and the 
personal distribution of income. 
